TRUTH

DEVELOP'D,

AND

INNOCENCE

PROTECTED:

OR,

The Merits and Demerits of the Late Commander in Chief of the BRITISH Forces in GERMANY ſet forth, and proved from undoubted Facts; and his Character cleared from the accumulated Aſperſions which have been caſt thereon.

Humbly addreſſed to BOTH HOUSES OF PARLIAMENT.

You have heard the ACCUSERS, now hear the ACCUSED.

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BRITISH MUSEUM
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TRUTH

DEVELOP'D, &c.

My Lords and Gentlemen,

AFTER the many bitter reflections, and ſarcaſms, which have been accumulated upon this great officer, mankind in general will be apt to imagine, that it will be a difficult taſk to prove him not culpable, eſpecially as his opponents are ſo powerful, and where ſo many great perſonages have appeared at their head; but upon a more critical enquiry into the matter, every impartial perſon will clearly perceive, that he is not guilty of the crimes laid to his charge, and that we have, in an arbitrary manner, condemned an innocent perſon. I am moved, to defend this cauſe, by no party; heated by no faction; encouraged by no views of gain. Had I imagined his accuſation to be juſt, I ſhould not have put pen to paper in his defence; but as the contrary will too clearly appear to any

critical and impartial inquirer, I flatter myſelf, I ſhall be able to convince, not only you the right honourable and honourable repreſentatives of the nation, but every individual thereof, from undoubted facts, of the many injuries which he has received. A great number of pamphlets have already appeared againſt this nobleman, ſome make him guilty of cowardice, ſome of negligence, and others of diſobeying his orders. The public adhere to the opinions of theſe authors, and have already tried and condemned him without hearing his defence. Strange proceedings in a free ſtate! is *Great Britain* ſo far degenerated from her priſtine liberty? has faction at laſt overcome?

One of the chief of thoſe who would condemn this general, is the author of a letter to a late commander of the *Britiſh* forces in *Germany*. His ſtile is good, and his arguments at firſt ſight, ſeem to carry ſome weight with them; but upon a more critical enquiry they will appear to be frivolous, and even contradictory to truth itſelf. This author's reproaches are keen, and his reflections ſevere, although he would have us believe he proceeds in the tendereſt manner poſſible, for fear of inflameing the multitude. I ſhould be glad to know how he could inflame them any more, at leaſt thoſe who are capable of reading his pamphlet. But to avoid digreſſion, and a paper war, as much as poſſible, I ſhall, in the firſt place, proceed to prove, that the evi-

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dence on which the public and thoſe authors condemn this general officer is ſuch as will not juſtify the giving ſuch a ſentence, except under the moſt arbitrary government.

Secondly, I ſhall prove, that his conduct was ſuch as no impartial man could condemn. And,

Thirdly, I ſhall make ſome remarks upon the whole; and ſet forth to your lordſhips and the honourable gentlemen of the commons the many injuries he has ſuſtained, and how unjuſtly he has ſuffered in the public cauſe.

I ſhall ſupport my arguments by facts; carefully avoid partiality; and explain the merits and demerits of the cauſe in the cleareſt manner poſſible. I will freely appeal to your lordſhips, to the public in general, and even to thoſe perſons who have thus wantonly accuſed this general officer, whether they had any ſolid foundation for their accuſations, I had almoſt ſaid malicious inſinuations? However ſevere or contrary to the clamor of the public, the following pages may at firſt view appear, yet upon a critical enquiry they will be found to contain nothing but undoubted facts, and as ſuch, I flatter myſelf, no free citizen of *Great Britain*, no lover of truth, no impartial perſon, will have any juſt reaſon to condemn them.

It is a known fact, that as ſoon as the *Britiſh* forces paſſed over into *Germany*, and this general appeared at their head, the commander in chief of the confederate army, and ſome

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of his favourites, began to grow jealous of his power and intereſt, and to treat him with haughtineſs and diſreſpect; diſregarding any propoſal he made for the good of the army, and in fact for the ſervice in general; and refuſing him any ſhare in their councils, but demanding a punctual obedience to any orders which might be brought by *aids de camp*, or any other inferior officer. How much ſuch a proceeding was conducive to maintain that harmony which ſhould ſubſiſt between the officers of an army that join heartily in the common cauſe; how much it was conducive to preſerve his majeſty's *German* dominions from the ruin which threatened them, I will leave the impartial reader to judge.

This affair was ſoon known in *England*, and every good patriot was much diſturbed, and expreſſed his concern, when he reflected on the unhappy conſequences which might follow ſuch a proceeding. The truth was, the confederate army was every day worſted, and things appeared in a bad light, till the ſame jealouſies, diſcords, &c. began to ſpread in the enemy's army; which, in the end, proved their deſtruction, and which were the means by which the omnipotent Lord of all things gave us the advantage over them. Can we imagine that a free-born Briton, who was fighting in his country's cauſe, could approve of ſuch a proceeding? can we imagine that a nobleman who was, if I may uſe the expreſſion, his prince's favourite, and who, at the

the head of ſuch choſen bands, was hearty in his cauſe, could ſtoop to be treated with ſo much indignity?

But to return. All the laſt days of July the two armies were making preparations for battle; conſequently, it cannot be inſinuated, that there was any ſurprize in the caſe: neither could either of the generals excuſe himſelf of wrong proceedings by his being ſuddenly attacked.

On the firſt of Auguſt the armies were regularly drawn up, and the attack was made. The *French* immediately perceived the order of the confederate army, and turned their chief force on its right wing, and if they had not the beſt troops perhaps in the world to encounter with, I tremble to think of the conſequence. The centre, and left wing, of the confederate army was well ſupported with *Hanoverian* and *Heſſian* horſe; but the right wing, compoſed of *Britiſh* and *Hanoverian* infantry had no ſupport, but was to withſtand the choſen troops of *France* both horſe and foot; and, in fact, by their bravery, and the ſkilful management of their artillery, may be ſaid to have gained the battle.

Here the impartial part of mankind will begin to wonder, why this wing, which was to ſuſtain all the choſen bands of *France*, ſhould be left expoſed, and be ready to ſay, that it was occaſioned by the *Britiſh* general, in not bringing up his horſe, when the commander in chief ſent expreſs orders to him for ſo doing.

ing. In ſhort, here is ſome matter for wonder! Let us examine what it is! and ſee who was faulty, and who was not. When the commander in chief of an army perceives that he is to be attacked by an enemy, or when he is about to attack the enemy, he will uſe his utmoſt endeavours to ſupport every part of his army, at leaſt ſo eſſential a part as its right or left wing, to withſtand the enemy's attacks, and to attack them in turn. I ſay, he will certainly be careful to ſupport every part of his army, becauſe if any part thereof is not ſo well defended as the others, the enemy will immediately perceive it, and pour their utmoſt force upon that part, to put the troops which defend it in diſorder; conſequently their defeat muſt ſoon follow, and, without the greateſt precaution is taken, the whole army will be ruined; as it is a maxim in the art of war, that when once an army, or, in fact, any part thereof, is put in diſorder, its defeat muſt inevitably follow, except it is compoſed of the beſt diſciplined troops in the world. Was not this the means whereby his *Pruſſian* majeſty won the famous battles of *Rosbach* and *Liſſa*? The commander in chief of the allied army, notwithſtanding he was appriſed of all this, left his right wing expoſed. The corps of cavalry, commanded by the *Engliſh* general, which ſhould have ſupported it, was a conſiderable diſtance behind, and had no orders to advance till the *French* had made ſeveral attempts with horſe and foot to break

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the infantry whereof it was compoſed. Was this a time to order the cavalry to advance? eſpecially as they were to advance through a wood and ſeveral ſmall paſſes, where they were liable to be flanked and cut to pieces by the enemy, before they could form: which certainly muſt be the caſe, if thoſe ſelect bands of veterans had not ſo well charged and routed the *French* cavalry, and their artillery diſcompoſed the ſpirits of the ſeveral brigades of their infantry, which ſucceeded each other in the various attacks on this part. Well might the *Engliſh* general be puzzled by his receiving ſuch untimely orders, firſt for his whole corps to advance, and ſecondly, for only a part thereof. The enemy perceived this confuſion, and continued their attacks even to the fifth time; but they were as often repulſed, and at laſt obliged to retire in confuſion. So that, in truth, the brigades which compoſed this wing, unaſſiſted as they were, may be juſtly ſaid to have gained the victory, purely by their bravery and reſolution, and without any extraordinary merit to their chief. But, on the other hand, ſuppoſe this wing had been compoſed of troops that were in any degree leſs courageous and reſolute, and had been broken and confuſed, as the *Engliſh* general had all the reaſon in the world to believe they would be, as they were not aſſiſted by the cavalry, and had ſuch multitudes to encounter with, what would be the the conſequence of his bringing his cavalry through ſuch narrow paſſes, and a wood? I

am afraid the battle would not be leſs favourable to us than was that of *Fontenoy*. — But, perhaps, ſome perſons will be ready to ſay, that cavalry ſhould be always poſted at ſome diſtance from the infantry, to be free from the enemy's cannonade. This I will readily grant; but then this diſtance is not to be equal to the diſtance that the *Engliſh* general was poſted with his corps, behind the infantry of the right wing, in the caſe before-mentioned, neither ſhould there be any difficult paſſes between them.—But farther; as ſoon as this general had received an explanation from the commander in chief, of the orders ſent him, he ordered his cavalry to advance, notwithſtanding the many diſadvantages which any judicious officer might have obſerved to attend ſuch a march, and with as much regularity as it was poſſible for cavalry to advance: however, this is the foundation on which the public raiſe their cenſure; this is the baſis on which they build all their reproach: becauſe he was cautious and judicious, they accuſe him of cowardice, diſobeying of orders, diſaffection, and what not.—Immediately after the battle was declared in favour of the allies, the prince, to ſkreen his own neglect, declared that the *Engliſh* general had diſobey'd his orders, and expoſed the whole right wing of his army to the ſeveral attacks of the enemy, as I have already obſerved. He imagined, that this was a proper time to cruſh at once his dangerous rival, and ſave himſelf from reproach,

proach, and therefore took a proper means for ſo doing the next evening, when the whole army was aſſembled to fire a *feu de joye*. He now orders his thanks, &c. to be given to all the officers of the army, particularly to thoſe of the brigades of infantry, which compoſed the right wing; (in fact, they particularly deſerved his thanks, becauſe it is clear that they gave the battle in favour of the allies) he likewiſe orders his thanks to be given to the *Engliſh* lieutenant and major generals, but neglects their commander in chief; and to ſum up the whole, he ordered it to be declared to the marquis of *Granby*, that he had all the reaſon in the world to believe, that if he had commanded the cavalry of the right wing, his preſence would have contributed to make the victory of that day much more glorious and deciſive.

If the commander in chief of the *Engliſh* forces had been guilty of any miſtake, all the impartial part of mankind will readily acknowledge, that this was ſevere treatment before he had made his defence; but when he himſelf was the cauſe of this overſight, and uſed this method to ſkreen himſelf, in what light can we regard ſuch a proceeding? It muſt be confeſſed, that the *Engliſh* general was guilty of a miſdemeanor in one particular; although every good officer, and all the impartial part of mankind, who are judges in ſuch matters, will excuſe him, and when they hear the cauſe thereof, will admire his good conduct: I will

ſtate the caſe, and let your lordſhips, the gentlemen of the commons, and the public, determine how far he was guilty of what was laid to his charge.

When the commander in chief of an army gives orders for any part or detachment thereof to advance, retire, or in fact make any movement, the ſtrict rules of military diſcipline demand an exact obedience to ſuch orders,—here our general was faulty—he heſitated about his orders, when, according to ſtrict military diſcipline, he ſhould inſtantaneouſly have led on his men, although they were to be all cut to pieces, and entirely defeated: his chief was anſwerable for all the miſchief which might follow. But, then, on the other hand, when a commander in chief gives ſuch orders to his generals as are diſagreeable to the art of war, contrary to the intereſt of his army, and, in ſhort, which would, if they were exactly complied with, bring his army to ruin and deſtruction, ſhould his lieutenant generals immediately comply therewith, becauſe, perhaps, he had been guilty of a miſtake, and becauſe the ſeverity of military diſcipline demanded it? Would not the ſecond, third, and fourth in command with *Braddock*, have acted more for the good of his majeſty's colonies, if they had refuſed to advance, than by obeying his orders, and falling a ſacrifice to his raſhneſs and ignorance? Would not the *Auſtrian* troops have acted more for the good of their ſovereign, had they followed the prudent meaſures of lieutenant

tenant general count *Daun*, than they have done by following the raſh, inconſiderate operations of duke *Charles*, their commander in chief? A commander in chief ſhould be prudent and cautious, thoſe who are not ſo, do not deſerve that high office. A commander in chief may be guilty of miſtakes as well as any other man, but then he ſhould acknowledge himſelf in an error, and adviſe with his lieutenant generals — that the commander in chief of the allied army is a man of great military merit, I'll readily acknowledge, but that does not argue that he ſhould be more than a human being. In the caſe before us, it is clear he was guilty of an error — it was pardonable, becauſe we find that the greateſt heroes have been ſubject to the like. But we meet with but few inſtances, where a lieutenant general has prudence enough, or, in fact, reſolution enough to correct the orders of his chief, when they are contradictory to the art of war; and where the chief, as a recompence for ſo doing, brands him with cowardice, and what not, and makes him the object of his hatred.

The brave marſhal *Schwren*, in the laſt *German* war, diſobeyed his royal maſter, where he was convinced his orders, if obeyed, would hazard a defeat, and the king was much enraged thereat, ordered the marſhal to confinement, notwithſtanding he was his military tutor, and his operations to be carried on with double vigor. But what was the conſequence?

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Ten thouſand of his brave veterans fell a ſacrifice to his raſhneſs, and he loſt the advantages he had before gained; but he repented, confeſſed his error, and reſtored the marſhal to favour. The former part of the caſe before us is a parallel to this, but the later widely different therefrom. The *Engliſh* general, inſtead of being reſtored to favour, and being rewarded for his merit, fell a ſacrifice to the reſentment and jealouſy of his chief. Again, we have another inſtance of the great ſpirit of the *Pruſſian* monarch, when marſhal *Keith* corrected his order about the fortification of his camp at *Hochkirchen*. The king would have his way, contrary to the marſhal's advice; but what was the conſequence? Juſt as the marſhal had foretold the *Auſtrians* attacked, and he and many more brave officers fell a ſacrifice to their maſter's folly: but their maſter ſaw his error, and ſorely lamented their loſs; nay, further, we have a more recent example of the raſhneſs of this great general, when he ſent expreſs orders to general *Finck*, to march and occupy a poſt, where he was to have the whole army of marſhal *Daun*, and that of the empire to contend with, intending to prevent theſe armies from retreating into *Bohemia*. The lieutenant general *Finck*, and many more of the prudent officers, repreſented the impoſſibility of cutting off the retreat of ſuch a numerous force, with the few troops that were ordered for that purpoſe: but the king was poſitive; the general obeyed; and I tremble

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to think how this affair will terminate. This whole corps, being near one third of his whole army, was ſurrounded and taken priſoners; *Saxony* muſt ſoon be loſt; and I wiſh thoſe may be all the ill conſequences which may attend this raſh undertaking.

Thus we ſee the greateſt heroes are ſubject to error; but, then, thoſe ſhew a noble ſpirit who acknowledge their faults. Has the commander in chief of the allied army done this? Has he not rather ſacrificed an innocent perſon to his jealouſy and reſentment, becauſe he offered to contradict his orders, or rather to heſitate on his orders, notwithſtanding they were contradictory to the art of war, and detrimental to the ſervice of his royal maſter? were they not to march cavalry through narrow paſſes, a wood, &c. where they were liable to be flanked and cut to pieces by a ſuperior enemy? were they not equally rigid with thoſe given to the *Britiſh* troops, at the battle of *Fontenoy*, and rather more hazardous? at this fatal place the *Britiſh* brigades were ordered to advance, although they were to be flanked by the enemy's batteries. The lieutenant generals were leſs prudent, and marched on, to oblige their raſh commander, but how did this affair terminate? oh! I tremble to think of it! in ſtreams of blood, without the leaſt advantage. Our injured general at *Minden* had prudence enough to contradict this proceeding, and to act more for the good of his majeſty's ſervice. For which his chief,

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without hearing his defence, pronounced his deſtruction; and our thoughtleſs populace, even before they had examined the evidence, abided by the ſentence. I bluſh! I bluſh! my countrymen, that you ſhould be ſo eaſily impoſed upon; retract your cenſure, examine the evidence, and you will find your countryman innocent; his proceedings warranted by reaſon and the art of war; and that he did nothing contrary to the intereſt of his royal maſter and his country. But, perhaps, ſome people will be apt to ſay, that the prince was not the only perſon who accuſed this general of diſobeying of orders, neglect, cowardice, and what not; becauſe his *aid de camp*, and all the *Engliſh* officers of his corps bear witneſs of the ſame. What do they bear witneſs of? have they bore witneſs of any thing elſe, but that the general heſitated when he received ſuch untimely and unſatisfactory orders? do not they all affirm, that he galloped to the prince to demand an explanation thereto? is this condemning him? again, it may be ſaid, that the ſame means which were taken to bring on the cavalry after this long heſitation, might be taken immediately after the orders were delivered; as the dangers attending ſuch a movement would not be greater at that time, than they were at the time when the cavalry marched forward unmoleſted. It muſt be confeſſed, that this argument, at firſt ſight, ſeems to corroborate the evidence of the commander in chief, and to condemn the *Engliſh* general; but when

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we carefully weigh the matter, the contrary will too clearly appear, as thus: when the *Engliſh* general firſt received the orders to advance, he perceived the infantry of the right wing of the army almoſt ſurrounded with the troops of *France*, both horſe and foot; ſuſtaining their powerful attacks; unaſſiſted by cavalry, and in great danger every minute of being entirely cut to pieces and defeated: the paſſes and ground to the right unguarded, or occupied by the enemy; no corps de reſerve to prevent their being flanked; no cavalry to ſupport them.

Was not this an admirable plan for a battle where the enemy were ſo numerous? thoſe perſons, who know nothing of the matter, will be ready to aſk, why did not the *Engliſh* general lead on his cavalry, when he was ordered, and ſupport this wing? the reaſon is clear; and any good officer will plainly perceive, that he acted prudently in diſobeying ſuch untimely orders.

If this corps had been poſted at a proper diſtance, to ſupport the wing before the action begun, the enemy would never have made ſo many furious attacks on this part; nor, in fact, have directed their ſuperior force thereon. But they immediately perceived the weakneſs of this wing, and imagined, that, by breaking it, they could eaſily bring on a general defeat.

Had the *Engliſh* general attempted to march forward his cavalry, the enemy would have

detached a corps to the right, that would have flanked him in paſſing through this wood, and theſe narrow paſſes, and his whole corps muſt have been cut to pieces; ſo that the flower of our army would have been ſlaughtered, without being able to make a proper defence; and becauſe the *Engliſh* general foreſaw this, and endeavoured to ſave his majeſty's troops from ſuch carnage, he has been compared to the king's confectioner at *Dettingen*.

But let me aſk the public, and the author of the firſt Letter to a late noble Commander, &c. which acted moſt for the good of the nation, and his majeſty's ſervice, his confectioner at *Dettingen*, or his phlebotomiſt at *Fontenoy*? which is the greateſt general, or hero, he that can gain his point with the loſs of fifty thouſand men, or he that can do it with the loſs of five thouſand? when the *Engliſh* general galloped up to the commander in chief, for an explanation of his orders, and to repreſent to him the danger of ſuch a movement, and how that it ſhould have been done before the action became general; 'tis evident, that the commander himſelf was convinced of his error, becauſe he now contradicted his former orders, by ordering him to leave a detachment of horſe to the right, to prevent his being flanked and harraſſed in his march, which he immediately complied with; more eſpecially, as he ſaw the infantry of the right wing, by their unparralleled bravery, had ſeveral times repulſed the *French* horſe and foot, and their artil-

artillery prevented their detaching any parties to the right. Why the *Engliſh* general muſt be reproached and cenſured for this, is ſtill to me a paradox, except an inferior officer is anſwerable for the miſtakes of his ſuperior.

Thus, my Lords and Gentlemen, it evidently appears, that the evidence on which the public and thoſe authors condemn this general officer is ſuch, as will not juſtify the giving ſuch a ſentence, except under the moſt arbitrary government; it being chiefly the effect of jealouſy and diſcord; and ſuch an evidence our law prohibits on the tryal of a guilty perſon. Why then ſhould we condemn an innocent perſon thereby?

I ſhall now proceed to conſider my ſecond thing propoſed, i. e. to inform your Lordſhips, the honourable Gentlemen of the Commons, and the Public, how the conduct of their general was ſuch, as no impartial perſon could condemn; and to ſet forth the maliciouſneſs of thoſe who would endeavour to prove him guilty by ſuch an evidence.

From what I have already obſerved, it will clearly appear, that an error of the commander in chief, was the occaſion of all the cenſure and reproach the *Britiſh* general has ſuffered; and that 'twas jealouſy which pointed him out as the object thereof.

The generality of mankind acknowledge, that the prince was miſtaken in regard to the place that the *French* would direct their ſuperior force againſt. He imagined it would be

the centre, or the left wing, and therefore fortified thoſe places to withſtand their attacks; but this was his miſtake; the enemy only feigned an attack on the left wing, and directed their greateſt force againſt the right, which put the prince in ſome confuſion, well knowing how unguarded he was in that part. He ſent orders after orders to the *Engliſh* general, to bring his corps to aſſiſt that wing, notwithſtanding he was in danger of being cut to pieces and defeated, if he had at that time attempted ſuch a movement.

If a commander in chief, therefore, will expoſe a part of his army to the attacks of the whole force of his enemy, and take no care to ſupport them while ſuch a ſupport might be brought with ſafety; or, in fact, by fighting to an equal advantage, can any impartial perſon condemn a lieutenant general for refuſing to let his corps be butchered, without giving them a chance to defend themſelves?

This was the caſe of our general, and yet we condemn him of cowardice, neglect, diſobeying of orders, and diſaffection. If he led on his men according to orders, the enemy would have detached a corps to the right, and flanked them as they were paſſing through the wood, whereby they would be all cut to pieces, and not have the leaſt chance to defend themſelves. Their caſe would be rather worſe than it was at *Fontenoy*, when they were ordered to march up to attack the enemy, notwithſtanding they were to be flanked by innumerable

numerable pieces of cannon in maſked batteries, which the lieutenant generals too tamely complied with, and ſacrificed ſome thouſands of our brave troops to the raſhneſs of their commander; troops that were capable, if they had been conducted by a ſkilful commander, of beating the like number of any troops in the known world. But to what diſadvantages do horſe fight, when they are flanked and cannonaded? had theſe lieutenant generals heſitated on theſe raſh orders, as lord *George* hath lately done, or repreſented the raſhneſs thereof to their chief, they would have acted more for the good of his majeſty's ſervice, and at the ſame time have ſaved the lives of ten thouſand brave men.

The great perſon who commanded in chief at that time, hath been ſeveral times cenſured for his raſhneſs; but our general at *Minden*, who would endeavour to prevent the like, hath been cenſured and reproached for his too great caution. Oh! the fickleneſs of mankind!

I will now aſk the impartial part of the public, in what particular lord *George*'s conduct is ſo much to be blamed? or, in fact, why he ought not to be commended, rather than cenſured? as 'tis clear he acted the part of a prudent general.

The populace will cry out, becauſe he did not bring up his troops and fight the enemy. But if he was poſted in ſuch a manner, that he could not advance without paſſing through

ſuch

ſuch places, as would, by their ſituation, diſorder his troops in their march, and where, at the ſame time, he was liable to be flanked by the enemy, conſequently where he was liable to have all his troops cut to pieces, without being of any ſervice, as but very few would be able to get to the poſt of action. Will not every impartial man be ready to ſay, that he acted very prudently in not raſhly obeying his orders?

A commander in chief, in the heat of a battle, will frequently give orders before he has duly weighed them; which, perhaps, if they were rigidly followed, would expoſe his whole army to ruin. Is a lieutenant general, then, to be condemned if he has prudence enough to abate the raſh meaſures of his chief, by expoſtulating with him, and ſhewing him his error? what would his *Pruſſian* majeſty have given, if he had had a lieutenant general who had prudence and reſolution enough to correct him, when his ſuperabundant raſhneſs made him attack marſhal *Daun*, although he was poſted on the ſummit of a hill near *Prague*, whereby he loſt the flower of his army, was obliged to raiſe the ſiege of that city, loſt all the advantages he had gained, and was reduced to the laſt extremity? but yet our general was condemned for not obeying orders, which might have been attended with conſequenees equally fatal; which the chief at that time muſt be ſenſible of, as there were ten chances to one, that the *Engliſh* infantry would not be able to with-

withſtand ſo many attacks of horſe and foot, and prevent the enemy from ſending detachments to flank the cavalry as they advanced.

We have almoſt a parallel caſe in the army of the enemy, before their defeat. Marſhal *Contades*, their chief, formed a plan of operations, equally raſh and inconſiderate againſt the allies.

The duke de *Broglio*, an officer of great merit, (perhaps more than his commander in chief) and a lieutenant general, ſaw how detrimental ſuch a plan would be to the ſervice of his maſter, repreſented the errors thereof to his chief in command, and refuſed to abide by his orders. But *Contades*, like a head-ſtrong *Frenchman*, demanded a punctual obedience to the military laws, and his orders were immediately obeyed; which, to our great joy, proved the defeat of his army.

Was the duke de *Broglio* to be blamed for this? was not he endeavouring, like an honeſt man, to promote his maſter's intereſt? was he condemned by his countrymen, notwithſtanding their army was defeated? is not he rewarded for his zeal with the chief command of their army? why then ſhould we condemn our general, who committed no other crime? why then ſhould we condemn a perſon, who did his utmoſt to promote the intereſt of his country?

But, farther, the author of a Letter to a late noble Commander, &c. has informed the public, that he has read and heard of commanders,

manders who have thought themſelves in duty bound to lead on their men to inevitable deſtruction, when the orders of their chief have been poſitive. 'Tis very true; what I have already obſerved of *Fontenoy* proves this aſſertion; but I muſt confeſs, that a kingdom, or ſtate, that employs ſuch commanders, or chief in command, had better make peace with it's enemies at any rate, than waſte it's ſubjects, blood and treaſure, for the pride of ſuch raſh inconſiderate men.

This author has obſerved in another paragraph, that lord *George* ſhould have advanced and fought according to the orders of his chief, whether they were right or wrong; and, in fact, if his whole corps was entirely cut to pieces.

I fancy the impartial part of mankind are convinced, that ſuch a proceeding would be very abſurd, and contrary to the intereſt of the nation. But what has poſſeſſed this gentleman, that he will make the prince equal to the ſupreme being, I cannot conceive. He ſays, " but how ſhall we clear your conduct " from imputations founded on evidence " which cannot lie? evidence which contains " a tacit impeachment of your behaviour, and " which proves at leaſt that you have deſerved " cenſure, grievous in the higheſt degree to a " ſoldier's honour: I mean prince *Ferdinand*'s " orders for a *feu de joye*." An evidence which cannot lie!—Mark well the expreſſion! ſurely the prince, great as he is, will not be obliged

to

to this author for his compliment. The truth of this evidence will appear from what I have already obſerved. Some other extraordinary paragraphs of this author's pamphlet, I ſhall hereafter examine, when I make my remarks on the whole.

'Again,' it has been inſinuated to the public, that captain *Smith*, the general's *aid de camp*, interceded for the *Britiſh* cavalry to advance, otherwiſe the general would never have led them on, but have remained an idle ſpectator of the whole battle. But this has clearly appeared to be nothing more than a formed ſtory to hurt the general's character in the opinion of the public. 'Tis true, that when the *Britiſh* and *Hanoverian* infantry had repulſed the *French* horſe, and our cannon had put their foot in diſorder, ſo that all that part of their army was in confuſion and beginning to fly; Captain *Smith* repreſented to the general, the neceſſity there was of purſuing them, and that the cavalry might then advance without any danger from the enemy's corps de reſerve, at leaſt, any more than fighting to an eqùal advantage; upon which, the general inſtantaneouſly ordered the cavalry to advance in a regular manner; but as they were poſted at ſuch a diſtance, by the time they had reached the poſt of action, and were drawn out in a line to be in readineſs to charge the enemy's cavalry, whom they expected to find rallying, or commencing a new attack, they were ordered to diſmount their men, and the battle

was declared to be in favour of the allies. How, then, could this general be guilty of any tardy movement, or for what part of theſe operations is he cenſured?

It has been likewiſe inſinuated to the public, that colonel *Fitzroy* repreſented to our general, that it was a glorious opportunity for the *Engliſh* to diſtinguiſh themſelves; and that he might gain great honour, by leading them at that time to action; but that the general was deaf to all the colonel's perſuaſions, and deſired him not to be in too great a hurry, notwithſtanding he brought the orders of the commander in chief for advancing, and deſired they might be immediately complied with. The matter of theſe orders has been hitherto very falſely repreſented to the public. The truth of it is as follows:

Colonel *Fitzroy* came galloping from the commander in chief, with orders for lord *George* to lead on the *Britiſh* cavalry towards the left, for the ſupport of the left wing, or centre, near which the prince was poſted; at the ſame time that captain *Ligonier*, another of the chief commander's *aid de camps*, was giving his orders for the whole corps under his command to advance towards the right, for the ſupport of the *Britiſh* and *Hanoverian* infantry, which had ſuſtained the greateſt force of the enemy. The reaſon why our general did not inſtantaneouſly obey the firſt orders, I have taken notice of.

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The general might well desire the colonel not to be in a hurry, and express his surprize at the orders he brought! we find he immediately said, it was impossible the commander in chief could mean to dispose of his corps in such a manner, and that he would immediately seek out the prince, to explain his meaning: however, lest the service should suffer while he was obtaining this explanation, he ordered his *aid de camp* to lead on, towards the right, his whole corps of cavalry, as far as they could advance, without being flanked by the enemy, or attacked to a very great disadvantage. When he found the commander in chief, and represented to him the position of the enemy, and the unreasonableness of his orders, he seemed convinced of his error, and ordered him to leave some squadrons to the right, to prevent his being flanked, &c. in his march, to advance with the rest to support the infantry of the right wing, and to charge the enemy which opposed that part, if they renewed their attacks. This he did as fast as possible; in fact, as fast as cavalry could march in order of battle; and extended his corps in one line, as the prince directed. But how he has, by any part of these proceedings, merited so much censure and reproach, is still to me an enigma. If any person was guilty of an error, it was the commander in chief. Why then should the innocent suffer for the guilty? altho' the prince is a man of great military merit, yet we should not adore him as a

deity. The greateſt heroes are ſubject, as well as others, to errors, and raſh actions; why, then, ſhould we imagine the commander in chief of the allied army totally exempt therefrom, and condemn our countryman, who endeavoured to correct him of a very material one?

Seeing, then, that lord *George* cannot be proved guilty of thoſe crimes which are laid to his charge, and that he did his utmoſt for the good of his country, in what light can we regard thoſe perſons, who were the authors of all the malicious cenſure which hath been caſt on his character, and who would inſinuate to the public, that he was guilty of crimes, whereof he was really innocent? I need not obſerve how eaſy my countrymen are brought to believe reports, altho' they are in themſelves unreaſonable and abſurd; witneſs, the *Lilliputian*'s progreſs through a quart bottle, &c. But if we muſt needs have ſome whimſical report, or fancy, to amuſe ourſelves with, let us not take the reputation of an innocent perſon for an object for our imagination to work on.

From what I have already obſerved, your Lordſhips, the Gentlemen of the Commons, and all the impartial part of the public, will clearly perceive, that our commander is not guilty of the crimes that are laid to his charge; that the malicious reports, which have been raiſed and propagated againſt him, were, in the firſt place, the effect of jealouſy, and have been

been imbibed by a too credulous people, who are always ready to have ſome new object for their fancy to feed on: but thoſe cringing ſycophants, who are ſo aſſiduous in ſpreading ſuch reports by pen and tongue, when they know they are falſe, with the view of gain, or preferment, we ſhould abominate, and regard as wretches much below the notice of rational beings.

I come now to the third thing propoſed; i. e. to ſet forth the many injuries our general has received; how unjuſtly he has ſuffered in the eye of the public; and to make ſome remarks upon the whole.

Firſt, then, I ſhall take notice of the treatment our general received from the commander in chief of the army, and thoſe of his *ſuite*; and, ſecondly, from his own countrymen; particularly thoſe perſons, who would endeavour to inflame the public againſt him, by their deluſive arguments and affected candor. The day after the battle, the commander in chief of the army, ordered it to be declared to the marquiſs of *Granby*, that he was perſuaded, that if he had the good fortune to have him at the head of the cavalry of the right wing, his preſence would have greatly contributed to make the deciſion of that day more compleat and more briliant.

Mankind would be apt to imagine, the commander in chief would not be guilty of caſting ſuch a bitter reflection on an *Engliſh* general, except he had been convinced of his

his having done ſome great crime; nay, even then, it was ſomewhat cruel to expoſe an officer of rank in ſuch a manner, before he was tried by a court-martial, and before he had made his defence. But upon a critical enquiry into the matter, it evidently appears, that our general was not guilty of any crime, but did his utmoſt to promote the intereſt of his country? why then ſhould the prince make him the object of his hatred? why then ſhould he cenſure him in ſuch a ſevere manner? I muſt confeſs that, from the good opinion I have conceived of the prince, this proceeding hath made him appear a contraſt to himſelf: in fact, to judge the moſt favourably of the matter, we muſt conclude it was the effect of jealouſy; and to what lengths will not that deteſtable paſſion carry a man, who has not uncommon reſolution and fortitude to withſtand its baneful influence.

However, let it be jealouſy, or let it be what it will, 'tis clear, that our countryman was greatly injured by it, as he has loſt his reputation, and all his military employments; is it in the prince's power to make him amends for ſuch a loſs? is not this a cruel and unprecedented uſage? does his *Pruſſian* majeſty caſt ſuch bitter reflections upon his generals, altho' they have been guilty of crimes, before they are condemned by a court-martial? did he blaſt the character of marſhal *Schwerin*, when he diſobeyed his own inconſiderate orders? did not he thank him for his prudent conduct,

and load him with honours? but an *Engliſh* general, for only heſitating upon his orders, which, if they had been inſtantaneouſly obeyed, would have expoſed his whole corps to ruin, was condemned, without hearing his defence, and loaded with cenſure and reproach.

But, ſecondly, this account of the prince's proceedings was no ſooner received in *England*, than the public got hold thereof, believing it *verbatim*, as if it had been pronounced by an angel, and began likewiſe to cenſure and condemn their countryman, as if he had been guilty of the blackeſt crime, unheard, untried; imagining the commander in chief's word was a ſufficient evidence to juſtify their proceeding; notwithſtanding they were all aſſured, that he was jealous of his lieutenant general, and had ſeveral times treated him with diſreſpect and diſdain. It is really ſurprizing, that the people of *Great Britain* ſhould be ſo credulous.

Lord *George* has hereby undergone the ſevereſt cenſure, and been loaded with the moſt bitter reflections. But if an innocent perſon muſt be ſtigmatized, how ſhould the guilty be treated? ſhould the ſecond in command with *Matthews* be loaded with honours, whilſt that brave admiral himſelf was diſgraced? ſhould the commander at *Preſton-Pans* be continued in favour, whilſt the brave *Vernon* himſelf was diſregarded?

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No ſooner was our injured general arrived in his own country, than he was diveſted of all his military employments; branded with cowardice, diſobeying of orders, diſaffection, and mutiny; and pointed at as an object of contempt. The public in general joined to make him the object of their reſentment, eſpecially, as they were ſpirited on by the many pamphlets which were publiſhed againſt him; the moſt effectual means which his enemies could take to anſwer their purpoſe.

The chief of theſe pamphlets are the firſt and ſecond letters to a late noble commander of the *Britiſh* forces, &c. Theſe pieces are of an extraordinary kind, have been very inſtrumental in irritating the people againſt their country's general; and, therefore I ſhall examine them, and ſee what parts of them are true, and what are falſe. Theſe letters contain the moſt ſevere and malicious reflections, that it is poſſible for a heated imagination to invent; and partiality is exhibited in the moſt glaring manner, throughout almoſt every paragraph of the whole work. What the author meant, by ſaying he was moved by no perſonal animoſity, heated by no party, or inſtigated by no faction, I cannot divine. When an author undertakes to write the particulars of a recent tranſaction, he ſhould abide by the truth, and ſet forth every occurrence and ſcene of action in it's true light; he ſhould carefully avoid partiality, and the caſting of any inſult upon the perſon oppreſſed. The author of

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thoſe letters has been guilty of the contrary of all this, and yet he would endeavour to make the public believe that he was a friend of the general's, which has made them the more credulous in believing his aſſertions, eſpecially as his arguments, at firſt ſight, appear plauſible, and as his ſtile is flowing. This gentleman ſets out with obſerving, that he does not mean to add inſult to misfortune; that he does not mean to raiſe a fatal prejudice againſt the general, nor to anticipate public judgment againſt him, before he was legally convicted of public offence; and that he was ſenſible of the danger of inflaming the multitude under a free government. Now would any perſon imagine, that, notwithſtanding theſe aſſertions, he ſhould ſtrive to add inſult to misfortune; that the ſole intent of his work was to prejudice and inflame the public againſt an innocent perſon; and that he ſhould condemn him of diſobeying orders, neglect, cowardice, and diſaffection; even before he was legally convicted, and without any other authority than that of hearſay, and the aſſertion of his chief, who was prejudiced againſt him. I would adviſe the gentleman not to imagine, that the public, which may be compared to a many headed monſter, will be ſo eaſily hood-winked.—Again; this author proceeds to draw a parallel between the conduct of our general, and the conduct of the late unhappy Mr. *Byng*, and to inſinuate to the public, that the former was very aſſi-

duous in promoting the execution of the latter, with an intent to increaſe their prejudice againſt him. The conduct of the general bears not the leaſt ſimilitude to the conduct of the admiral; the latter, being the commander in chief, was to act as he thought proper, and had no difficulties to hinder him from going down to attack the enemy, with a ſuperior force; whereas the former had ſeveral difficult paſſes to advance through, where, as I have already obſerved, he was in danger of being flanked and cut to pieces by the enemy, without being able to make any defence: how then could this author draw a parallel between thoſe two perſons? What he has aſſerted with regard to the general's being aſſiduous in promoting the execution of the late unhappy admiral, is a notorious falſehood, and I am really ſurprized how the public can ſwallow down ſuch groſs abuſes. This gentleman has affirmed again, in another paragraph, that his pen ſhould not proclaim the general cowardly, negligent, or diſaffected, before he had been heard in his own vindication; and yet, immediately after, he accuſes him of all thoſe, and likewiſe of mutiny. Is not this writer a contraſt to himſelf? he farther obſerves, (Letter I. p. 9.) ſpeaking to the general; "To your country's detriment, and "your own diſhonour, the expectations of "the public are diſappointed. We looked "for a commander, and we find a commen-"tator; we depended upon an active war-

"rior,

" rior, and we meet with an idle diſputant:
" one, who, in the field of battle, debates
" upon orders with all the phlegm of an ac-
" cademic, when he ought to execute them
" with all the vigor and intrepidity of a hero."

As this gentleman has laboured ſo aſſiduouſly to make lord *George* appear culpable in the eyes of the public, he muſt not take it amiſs, if I inform him, that the aſſertions contained in this paragraph are no more like truth, than his pamphlets are like a candid performance. I cannot conceive in what our general has been detrimental to his country. Has not he hitherto acted the part of a brave officer? and does it not clearly appear, that he was innocent of the crimes laid to his charge at *Minden?* how then has he been to his country's detriment? again, in what was he an idle diſputant, or a commentator? would this gentleman have him, in the hour of battle, diſmount his men, and order them one way, and their horſes another? or would he have him lead them on to be ſlaughtered as they were at *Fontenoy*, without giving them any chance to defend themſelves? is it not more prudent to debate with the phlegm of an accademic, if it may be called phlegm, than to ruſh on with the fury of a madman? which acquired the moſt honour, and acted the moſt for the good of his country, the furious *Swede*, or the phlegmatic *Ruſſian*, his cotemporary? this author further obſerves, p. 10. that " ſuch are the imputations under which

" you labour at preſent (I ſuppoſe he means,
" ſuch are the crimes I charge you with) and
" facts notoriouſly public (may be notoriouſly
" falſe) afford grounds which more than coun-
" tenance a ſuſpicion of your miſconduct."
'Tis very clear, that this aſſertion bears a great ſimilitude to the former.—There is many an author, who, when he writes, gives the public to know that he has built his aſſertions on facts, imagining that his performance will thereby gain the greater eſteem; whereas, in reality, what thoſe authors offer as facts are no more than their own aſſertions, delivered in a plauſible manner, with an intent to deceive. Of this number is the author I am commenting upon. What he has aſſerted as facts are no more than his own aſſertions, and the vague opinions of a clamorous public: and yet from thoſe he will condemn an innocent perſon. How ſtrangely mankind are bent upon injuring each other! facts, when they are proved to be really ſuch, are the ſtrongeſt criterion of truth, and the moſt uncontrovertable of all evidence; but, ſtrictly ſpeaking, they cannot be ſaid to be ſuch before they are proved. How, then, can this author affirm, that his vague aſſertions are undoubted facts? He likewiſe further obſerves, that in the catalogue of worthies, who received the thanks of their chief, for their ſignal bravery in the day of battle, the name of the Britiſh general is omitted; and that he is ſtigmatized by an inſinuation, that his behaviour rendered the

the victory of the firſt of *Auguſt* leſs brilliant. This is true. But, pray, who was it that gave thoſe orders of thanks? and by whom was our general ſtigmatized? was it not by the commander in chief alone, and is it not clear that this omiſſion, and ſtigma, was occaſioned by his prior jealouſy? did not he contradict the orders he delivered to his aid de camp, when he ſaw himſelf in an error, and give a third order to lord *George* himſelf, which he immediately obeyed? who, then, was moſt guilty of a crime, the prince, or the lord? does it not clearly appear, from undoubted facts, and from evidence beyond contradiction, that our general inſtantaneouſly obeyed his orders, as ſoon as he received ſuch as any rational man could comply with? what, then, would this writer inſinuate? — But, notwithſtanding what I have plainly proved to the contrary, ſome partial perſons will be ready to ſay, with this author, that the prince muſt be right; that our general has diſobeyed orders; and that, if he had attacked the enemy as the prince directed, he might have made the day of victory much more brilliant.—It would be a difficult taſk to alter the opinion of the public, after they have been ſo far led on by ſuch plauſible, although falſe, inſinuations, even if an angel was to pronounce the contrary. However, I flatter myſelf, the impartial part of mankind, and men of ſenſe, will not be ſo far prejudiced againſt this caſe, as to ſhut their ears againſt truth, and thoſe facts,

facts, which the very enemies of our general have regarded as authentic. No: I am perſuaded, that the repreſentatives of the people, and thoſe of the number I have juſt now mentioned, will hear the defence of an innocent perſon, and judge impartially of his injuries, notwithſtanding the torrent of power is againſt him.

Let me, then, ſet forth thoſe facts which his very enemies hold authentic, and from them prove, that the inſinuations of this much reſpected author are as oppoſite to truth, as the Eaſt is to the Weſt. When the prince, from the report which was made to him by the duke of *Richmond*, of the ſituation of the enemy, and of the furious attacks they were making upon the right wing of the allies, recollected that this wing was unſupported by cavalry, as he did not expect the grand attack to be made on this part, he ſent captain *Ligonier* with orders for the *Britiſh* general to advance with his whole corps of cavalry, to ſupport this wing. Immediately after, upon his perceiving ſome new movement of the enemy, he ſent col. *Fitzroy*, another of his *aides du camp*, with orders for the *Britiſh* cavalry only to advance towards the left, for the ſupport of the left wing. The *Engliſh* general appeared ſurprized at this contradiction, as he knew the right wing was in ſuch a dangerous ſituation, and ſaid he would ſeek out the prince, and get an explanation of this affair. After he had found him, and repreſented

ſented to him the whole ſtate of the caſe, he was ordered to leave ſome ſquadrons to the right, to prevent his being flanked in his march, and to advance with the reſt to ſupport the infantry of the right wing: this he immediately did. Theſe are undoubted facts; which the very enemies of the *Britiſh* general hold authentic. Now I will examine the pretended facts of this author, and ſee how far they are agreeable to thoſe real ones I have juſt now taken notice of.—Our author obſerves, that "on that ſignal day (meaning the firſt of "*Auguſt*) when the action grew warm, and "became worthy of your interpoſition, it is "ſaid, that his highneſs prince *Ferdinand*, the "commander in chief, diſpatched one of his "*aides du camp* to you, with orders for you "immediately to attack a particular body of the "enemies troops. Inſtead of an inſtant com-"pliance with theſe orders, it is reported that "you heſitated, and at length intimated, that "there muſt be ſome miſtake in the delivery "or injunction of thoſe orders." I am aſtoniſhed how this author could have the face to impoſe ſuch a groſs falſehood on the public, and found his facts on hearſay. Is it not clear, that the *Engliſh* general never did receive any orders to attack any particular body of the enemy's troops? how then could this candid gentleman invent ſuch ſtuff, and make us believe he gathered it from the public report? but let us imagine there was ſuch a public report, which I am perſuaded there was not,

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was that a ſufficient evidence to condemn a perſon by, as this author hath done our nobleman? oh fye! my countrymen! why do you ſuffer yourſelves to be ſo abuſed? this writer further aſſerts, that " you are farther " reported to have added, that you would " ſpeak to the prince yourſelf. Before you " could find an opportunity of addreſſing " yourſelf to his highneſs, however, the oc- " caſion for which your ſervice was required, " is ſaid to be irretrievably loſt: a conſequence " which might have been expected from ſuch " delay."—This aſſertion is of a piece with the former. However, if it was true, the commander in chief would be as much to blame as the *Britiſh* general; becauſe, if the enemy's attacks were ſo furious on any particular part of the army, the commander in chief ſhould have foreſeen that they were diſpoſed for making ſuch attacks, and have prevented it in time; at leaſt, every good commander would do ſo. But I need not digreſs upon this aſſertion, as it is clear that it is as falſe as the former; for the *Britiſh* general was never ordered to attack, conſequently, it could never be ſaid, that the ſervice could ſuffer by his delay: nay, even the orders which he received to advance were inſtantaneouſly obeyed, as far as any prudent man under the heavens would have obeyed them. The fact is as follows:

When the *Britiſh* commander in chief received thoſe untimely and contradictory orders from

from the two *aides du camp* of the commander in chief of the army, he immediately, to avoid any injury the ſervice might ſuſtain, ſent *Smith*, his *aid du camp*, to general *Moſtyn*, with orders to bring on the *Britiſh* cavalry, which was but a part of his corps, as far as they could advance, without being flanked by the enemy, whilſt he himſelf galloped to the prince for an explanation; how, then, could the ſervice ſuffer by any fault of his? — In ſhort, the truth is, this author would endeavour to prejudice the public againſt their countryman, and condemn him of crimes of which he was not guilty; but he has not laid a proper plan for ſo doing. I fancy he is not acquainted with the military art; if he was, I would deſire him to inform the public, in what manner he could have better prevented the diſadvantages, which might ariſe from any miſtake of the means by which the orders were to be put in execution, and by what means any perſon might have carried them into action more expeditiouſly, without having his whole corps unneceſſarily butchered.

Does it not therefore evidently appear, from a candid ſurvey of the whole affair, that what this writer has puffed upon the public as facts, are diametrically oppoſite thereto, and contrived only to ruin an innocent perſon? and, further, is not a fact that prince *Ferdinand* did not imagine that the *Britiſh* general had done amiſs, even when he rode up to him for a farther explanation of his orders, and to re-

preſent to him the impoſſibility of complying with thoſe he had already given by his two *aides du camp?* would not he immediately have charged him with having been guilty of a crime, if he had been guilty of any? does it not evidently appear, that if the prince had any intention for his corps of cavalry to have paſſed before the infantry and artillery, and to have charged the enemy's lines, the orders he ſent for their advancing were ſent at leaſt an hour too late? how then could the *Britiſh* general be in fault, if the ſervice which might have been performed thereby was neglected? and, again, how ſhould he attack, if he never had any orders for ſo doing? Seeing that what this author has here aſſerted is diametrically oppoſite to truth, can we, then, ſufficiently admire his aſtoniſhing aſſurance, in aſſerting, that it was "a conſequence nevertheleſs ex-"tremely fatal, and which renders your ſup-"poſed failure more grievous and unpardon-"able, if it is true, which many affirm, that "the greateſt part of a whole regiment of "bold and gallant *Britons* were cut to pieces, "for want of being ſupported by the attacks "which you was ordered to make?"

It has been already proved, from the authentic account of the battle, that the *Engliſh* general was never ordered to make any attack; how, then, can this author affirm, that a whole regiment of gallant *Britons* were cut to pieces, for want of being ſupported by ſuch an attack? 'tis clear, that the prince never

ver imagined that they would want any ſupport, till the enemy directed their ſuperior force againſt them; at which time he ordered the *Britiſh* general to advance only, to prevent the efforts of the enemy's horſe; and in a few minutes after ſent him another order, to advance part of his cavalry to ſupport the left. The reaſon why the *Britiſh* general heſitated on the receiving thoſe orders, I have already fully explained; and I would now aſk this author, by what means he could have prevented this regiment from being ſo violently attacked by the enemy? and whether the commander in chief was not more culpable in not ordering them a timely ſupport? But their unparalleled reſolution and courage, without any other means, ſupplied that ſupport the prince ſhould have ordered them in time, and which this author wrongly accuſes the *Britiſh* general with delaying to give, and carried them to victory through the fire of the ſuperiority of their enemies, notwithſtanding the many furious attacks of their cavalry, and their violent cannonade.

This aſtoniſhing author further aſſerts, (page 17, and 18.) " highly culpable, as from " ſuch behaviour you are ſuppoſed to have " been, a farther opportunity yet offered, as it " is ſaid, which, had you embraced it with vi- " gor, would, in ſome degree, have reſtored " your credit, and made ſome reparation for " the calamitous effects occaſioned by your " former unaccountable failure.

 " When

" When the conduct and valor of the con-
" federate army, tho' not ſeconded by your en-
" deavours, had repulſed the enemy, and
" routed their forces, his highneſs, we are
" told, again ſent to you, by another of his
" *aides du camp*, and ordered you to purſue
" a flying party of the enemy. To theſe or-
" ders you are likewiſe ſuppoſed to have re-
" fuſed obedience."

I cannot conceive what this author means, by thus impoſing upon the public, and by aſſerting ſuch notorious falſehoods, as if they were inconteſtible facts. However, he is really humorous in one ſenſe, altho' it is not meant ſo. He offers thoſe aſſertions to the public, as facts, altho' he has no other foundation for them, than ſuppoſitions, reports, and hear-ſays. What will he ſay, when I affirm, and ſupport my affirmation, by the authentic hiſtory of the battle, that no ſuch ſecond opportunity did ever offer; and that his highneſs never did ſend any *aid du camp* with ſuch a meſſage. Conſequently, this report is of his own invention, and intended purely to injure an innocent perſon. If ever ſuch orders were ſent, I ſhould be glad this gentleman would let the public know who carried them. We find no ſuch account in the hiſtory of the battle, or in the letter that was wrote by colonel *Fitzroy*.

Any perſon would be apt to imagine, that this author had lately a full pardon from the pontif of *Rome*, for all the miſdeeds he has done,

done, or may do; otherwiſe, he muſt certainly be a perſon who never thinks of futurity. He goes on further to aſſert, that " you are " ſaid to have anſwered the *aid de camp*, who " brought you orders for the purſuit, that you " was a ſtranger to the roads, and unacquainted with the paſſes. Had this weak anſwer " contained the leaſt apology for your diſobedience, yet the ſuppoſed reply of the *aid de* " *camp* ſtripped you even of the ſhadow of an " excuſe. It is aſſerted, that he offered to " ſhew you the way himſelf, and conduct " you with ſafety.

" Thus driven to extremity, and left without the ſlighteſt pretence for diſobeying the " orders you had received, is it to be believed " that you ſtill demurred, and puſhed your " expoſtulations to the verge of mutiny? " the anſwer which public rumour has put " into your mouth, is indeed incredible. " It is juſt that you ſhould know it. It is affirmed, that, perſiſting in your diſobedience, " after long heſitation, you declared, that you " did not think it adviſeable to hazard his majeſty's troops."

I muſt confeſs, that this gentleman is a perſon of great natural talents, otherwiſe he could never have invented ſuch a plauſible ſtory; but, however plauſible it may, at firſt ſight appear, it will eaſily be proved to be nothing more than a compoſition of inconſiſtent ſtuff, that bears not the leaſt reſemblance to truth. In the firſt place, this gentleman aſſerts, that lord

lord *George* anſwered the *aid de camp*, who brought the prince's orders for the purſuit of the enemy, that he was a ſtranger to the roads, and unacquainted with the paſſes. The authentic account of the battle, the letters of colonel *Fitzroy* and others, declare that the prince never ſent any ſuch orders; therefore, muſt not it be a notorious falſehood to ſay, that he diſobeyed orders, which he never received? In ſhort, the fact is as follows:

When colonel *Fitzroy*, the *aid de camp* who brought the meſſage which this author has ſo ſhamefully commented upon, came to the *Britiſh* general, with the prince's orders for the cavalry of his nation to advance towards the left, and to leave the right wing expoſed, the general appeared ſurprized at the ſame, and ſaid it was impoſſible the duke could mean to break the line, and leave the right wing totally expoſed, and liable to be flanked by the enemy. "My anſwer was, "(ſays the colonel) that I delivered his ſerene "highneſs's orders, word for word, as he "gave them."—The general aſked again, how was it poſſible for the cavalry to march round to the left, for the ſupport of that wing, ſeeing that the paſſes were narrow, and they would be expoſed to the enemy's cannonade, without being able to defend themſelves? and further obſerved, that the right wing, where was the heat of the battle, would be left without any ſupport: but, that the ſervice might not be delayed, he would ſend his *aid de camp*

to

to lead them on, as far as poſſible, towards the right, till he had an explanation from the prince himſelf, which he would immediately endeavour to obtain; (what this explanation was, and the next orders the prince gave, I have already ſet forth) however, colonel *Fitzroy* offered to lead the cavalry towards the left, where they might be drawn up behind a wood, and conſequently, not expoſed to the enemy's cannonade; but, as the general immediately found the commander in chief, and received contrary orders, theſe could not be put in execution.

Our general obſerves, that, " the duke then " ordered me to leave ſome ſquadrons to the " right, which I did, and to advance the reſt " to ſupport the infantry. This I declare I " did, as faſt as I imagined it was right for " cavalry to advance, in order of battle, till " we arrived to the rear of the infantry of " our right wing, and our batteries, where " we halted; and afterwards received no or- " ders, till that which was brought by the " duke of *Richmond*, and colonel *Webb*, to " extend in one line towards the moraſs. It " was accordingly executed; and then, in- " ſtead of finding the enemy's cavalry to " charge, as I expected, the battle was de- " clared to be gained, and we were ordered " to diſmount our men." As theſe are facts which are not diſputed, what can this author mean by impoſing ſuch groſs, ſuch flagrant untruths upon the public? can he mean any thing

thing elſe than the deſtruction of an innocent perſon? or would he endeavour to make all the public appear ſuch fools, as the *French* have ſeveral times done, by threatening us with an invaſion? but, however, this laſt paragraph of his is not ſo well contrived, as are the others; for, both the general officer, and the *aid de camp*, muſt be very ignorant of the arts of war, and even deſtitute of common ſenſe; if they had uttered ſuch expreſſions to each other, as this writer hath aſſerted.

Is it poſſible that ſuch a nobleman as the *Britiſh* general, whom the world will allow to have a good ſhare of underſtanding, would make himſelf ſo ridiculous, as to aſk which road he ſhould take to purſue a flying enemy? would not the enemy mark out the road? would not they direct his purſuit? again, let us ſuppoſe he had aſked ſuch a queſtion: is it to be credited that an officer, who was honoured with the commiſſion of an *aid de camp*, to the commander in chief of an army, ſhould be ſo ſimple as to anſwer, that he would ſhew him the way, and undertake to conduct him with ſafety? what danger could there be in purſuing a flying enemy? but, further, this author aſſerts, that the *Britiſh* general declared he did not think it adviſeable to hazard his majeſty's troops. Our writer now begins to be ſomewhat humorous; for although the aſſertion is of a piece with the former, as no ſuch meſſage was ever brought, nor any ſuch anſwer ever made, yet he imagines, he hath expreſſed

expreſſed it in a witty and ironical manner. But the anſwer is in itſelf ſo abſurd, that no man of common ſenſe will give any credit to it. How can it be believed, that the *Britiſh* general, even if he was the greateſt coward in his country, ſhould make ſuch an anſwer? could his majeſty's troops run any hazard, or be expoſed to any danger, in purſuing a flying enemy? I have more charity for the weakeſt man in *Britain*, nay, I had almoſt ſaid for our author himſelf, than to think he could be capable of making ſo abſurd an anſwer. Can any perſon, who has any knowledge of our noble general, as an officer, or even as a man, imagine that he could be guilty of uttering ſuch an expreſſion? No. It is well known that he has fought gloriouſly in his country's cauſe; how, then, can any impartial man imagine, that he is ſo ignominiouſly degenerated?

Our author, after the moſt ſevere cenſure, further obſerves, p. 21. that "to place your "conduct in every candid light it ſeems to "admit of; let us grant, that you really "thought the commander in chief to have "been miſtaken in his orders, and that it was "inexpedient and unadviſeable to carry them "into execution: yet remember, that they "were orders for an attack. If you did not "approve of the mode preſcribed, it was ne-"verthelefs your duty to purſue the ſubſtance "of his directions."

I have already repreſented the orders which were given from the authentic account of the battle, and it evidently appears, that the *Britiſh* general was never ordered to attack; why, then, will this author continue to aſſert ſuch untruths, and to draw bitter reflections therefrom?—He goes on further to obſerve (p. 22.) "If you was under a ſtrong conviction, that "the plan of operations, injoined by the or- "ders, was injudicious and ineffectual, you "had certainly better have diſcharged them, "by altering the ſcheme, and leading your "men to action in a manner more conform- "able to your own judgment. You would "have incurred leſs danger, and ſuſtained leſs "diſhonour, by an attack inconſiſtent with "your orders, than by an inglorious inactivity."

I need not again repeat the orders for advancing, which lord *George* received, nor ſet forth how improper they were to be immediately complied with; becauſe I have already informed mankind of the impropriety thereof, and ſhewn, to a demonſtration, how that he acted moſt prudently for the good of his majeſty's ſervice, in neglecting to put them in execution, till he had a farther explanation thereof from the prince himſelf; which, when he received, he inſtantaneouſly complied therewith. But this writer would inſinuate, that he had better have led on his men to be butchered, than have ſought an explanation to theſe orders.—What can he mean, by ſaying, that the general would have incurred leſs danger,

ger, and ſuſtained leſs diſhonour, by an attack inconſiſtent with his orders, than by an inglorious inactivity? Every general officer will readily acknowledge, at leaſt, if he is an impartial perſon, that he did no diſhonourable action, by purſuing the meaſures which he did. How can it be affirmed, that he remained in inactivity, when he immediately, on receiving colonel *Fitzroy*'s orders, galloped to the prince for an explanation thereof, as they were contrary to thoſe he had a few minutes before received from *Ligonier*; and at the ſame time, leſt the ſervice might ſuffer whilſt he was obtaining this explanation, ordered his *aid du camp* to lead on his corps, as far as the ſcene of action would admit of, without their fighting to an inconceivable diſadvantage, *i. e.* by being flanked and cannonaded, as I have already obſerved?

Do not the moſt groſs and notorious falſehoods appear in almoſt every paragraph of this gentleman's pamphlet? does it not clearly appear, that he is ſtudying the deſtruction of an innocent perſon? and, if I may be allowed the expreſſion, that he will daſh thro' thick and thin to accompliſh his ends? why, then, ſhould his vague and groundleſs aſſertions have any weight with the public? why ſhould we be led from our reaſon with ſuch ſtories? muſt it be, becauſe they are plauſible, or becauſe their inventor would endeavour to introduce tyranny amongſt us? no, I hope we are not ſo far degenerated from the ſtandard of perfec-

tion, as to admit them on any account. Again, he obſerves, in the ſame page, that "there is a "generoſity in *Britons*, which diſpoſes them "to abſolve the brave and active, tho' their "efforts may be improperly directed, and un-"ſucceſsfully applied. He who fights contrary "to orders, appears in a fairer light, than he "who attempts to apologize for inactivity, by "arraigning his directions."

How can this gentleman, with any truth, offer ſuch an aſſertion? was the brave, the active *Matthews* abſolved, altho' his efforts were properly directed? was he not diſgraced and diſmiſſed from his command? Again, is it not a fact well known to the public, that his ſecond in command, who apologized for his inactivity, by arraigning his directions, was honoured, careſſed, and afterwards intruſted with the command of a ſquadron?

He further obſerves, in the ſame page, "if "you received orders to make an attack, that "word at leaſt muſt have been explicit; how "then could you remain in inactivity? how "could you ſpend the irrecoverable moments "in commenting on your orders, and waiting "for an explanation from your ſuperior?"

I have already plainly proved, from the authentic account of the battle, that the *Britiſh* general never did receive any orders to make an attack; that he did not remain in inactivity, and that he received two different orders, which were contrary to each other. Was it not requiſite, then, that he ſhould have an explanation

planation thereof, before he could prudently carry either of them into execution?

(Page 23.) This gentleman aſks lord *George*, "but above all, how could you ſtand an unmoved ſpectator of the carnage before your eyes? how could you ſee your countrymen, and fellow-ſoldiers, whom you was ordered to ſupport, ſlaughtered within your view, and yet with-hold your aſſiſtance?—This was adding inhumanity to diſobedience. If you have feeling, mourn the loſs of thoſe gallant fellows, who will hereafter riſe up in judgment againſt you, Their blood will fix indelible ſtains on your conſcience, never to be effaced."

O monſtrous! was there ever ſuch bitter reflections caſt upon an innocent perſon before? Is it not a piece of unparalleled cruelty, to aſſert groſs falſeſhoods, and afterwards to comment on them, as if they were undoubted facts? Are the inhabitants of *Great Britain* ſo far loſt to all ſocial virtues, that they ſhould ſuffer ſuch intolerable barbarity to be exhibited amongſt them? If this muſt be the caſe, no perſon, who has an enemy to raiſe a report againſt him, will be able to ſave himſelf from deſtruction.

This gentleman goes on, to ſet forth his own vague aſſertions; nay, I had almoſt ſaid falſehoods, and to draw ſevere reflections therefrom, till page 25, where he comes to theſe two concluſions. "In ſhort, there are but "two alternatives in the caſe.

"Firſt,

" Firſt, either you underſtood your orders, " but thought them improper to be put in ex- " ecution ; or,

" Secondly, you did not comprehend them, " and, therefore, left them unexecuted."

Did ever ſuch an intolerable, incoherent piece of ſtuff appear in public before? no, ſurely. Throughout his whole pamphlet, he hath been condemning an innocent perſon of cowardice, diſaffection, and mutiny; and now he comes to a concluſion, that the general either underſtood his orders, but thought them improper to be put in execution, or that he did not comprehend them, and therefore left them unexecuted. If either of theſe was the caſe, how then, could this clear-ſighted gentleman make him guilty of cowardice, diſaffection, or mutiny? if he did comprehend his orders, and did not think it prudent to carry them into execution, error in judgment alone was his fault. But if he did not comprehend them, and therefore left them unexecuted, the fault aroſe from his want of underſtanding. Conſequently, he could not be guilty of either of the crimes he hath been ſo wantonly accuſed with: and how the author will clear himſelf of this miſtake, I cannot conceive. However, in fact, theſe concluſions are unjuſtly drawn, and cannot be derived from the *Britiſh* general's behaviour at the battle of *Minden*. He did never aſſert, that it was the impropriety which the orders contained, that produced the doubt, which was to be carried into

into execution, or which made him heſitate; neither was it want of underſtanding, for both were perfectly underſtood. But it was the cruel carnage his corps muſt have been expoſed to, as I have already obſerved, which made him reaſon againſt the firſt; and the contradiction they conveyed, and the impoſſibility of executing two things at once, which made him not comply with the ſecond, till he had an explanation thereof from the prince. If, therefore, the ſervice was ſo preſſing, and either of theſe orders was of ſuch great moment, how was it, that the prince in leſs, than four minutes after, gave ſuch orders, as were contrary to both thoſe he had already given?

This gentleman further obſerves (p. 32.) when ſpeaking of prince *Ferdinand*'s orders— "In theſe orders there are many paſſages "which tacitly impeach your honour, and "condemn your conduct." However, in another paragraph of his pamphlet, he aſſerts, that he is not one of thoſe enthuſiaſts, who blindly pay adoration to heroes, yet he knows how to ſhew due reſpect to military merit.

Are not theſe two paragraphs a contradiction to each other? does not this author pay a blind adoration to the commander in chief of the allied army, by condemning a *Britiſh* general, becauſe this hero tacitly impeaches his honour and conduct? Is a tacit impeachment a ſufficient witneſs to condemn a free-born *Briton?* Such an impeachment might be ſufficient before the tribunal of the mogul of *India*;

India, but, ſurely, it will not do in a land famed for it's liberty.

Again, he obſerves, (page 33.) "You will "pardon me the ſeverity of concluding, that "from the natural conſtruction of prince *Fer-* "*dinand*'s orders, the commander of the right "wing has been guilty of a more than com- "mon failure of duty—he has been guilty of "diſobedience."—If this is not paying a blind adoration to a hero, then I know not what is; he condemns his countryman, by only the bare conſtruction of the prince's orders.

Let me tell this author, be who he will, that if the prince himſelf had condemned him, we, as *Britons*, had no right to abide by the ſentence, before he had an impartial hearing. And I am ſurprized, that the publick ſhould regard the ſentence, that ſuch a partial perſon hath paſſed upon this general, from his own conſtruction of the prince's orders?—But notwithſtanding our author hath argued this matter upon ſuch a ſandy foundation, nay, frequently without any foundation at all, he continues to aſſert in the following manner, (p. 35.) "Is it to be ſuppoſed, that his high- "neſs would raſhly mark a commander of "your conſequence, an *Engliſhman* of your "rank and family, with ſuch a ſtain of pub- "lic ignominy, before he had thoroughly in- "quired into the merits of your conduct, and "was fully ſatisfied that you deſerved the "ſtigma?"

How

How can he aſk, is it to be ſuppoſed that his highneſs would raſhly mark our noble *Engliſhman* with ſuch a ſtain of public ignominy, when it is paſt all doubt, that he did? can it be ſaid, that the prince made any enquiry into the merits of his conduct, when he never expreſsly charged him with any crime, nor permitted him to juſtify himſelf? does not lord *George* affirm to his countrymen, in his ſhort addreſs, p. 9. that he was cenſured unheard, condemned untryed, without information either of his crime or accuſers? why, then, will my countrymen abide by ſuch unjuſt proceedings?

This writer continues further to obſerve, in the ſame page, " had it appeared, that it " was impracticable for you to obey the or- " ders you received, you had not been diſ- " honoured with this mark of opprobrium. " In that caſe, it would have been ungene- " rous and unjuſt." From the authentic hiſtory of the battle, it clearly appears, as I have already obſerved, that it was impracticable for the *Britiſh* general to obey the orders he received; beſides, they were directly oppoſite to each other: conſequently, according to our author's own opinion, he has been ungenerouſly and unjuſtly treated. There was ſome unknown apologiſt of lord *George*'s, who attempted to juſtify his conduct to the public, and offered reaſons for that purpoſe, which our author thought not ſatisfactory, although they were founded on truth, and any impar-

tial man would think them ſufficient to anſwer the end for which they were intended. He, therefore, ſays after him, p. 36. "ſuppoſe," ſays this unknown apologiſt, "it "ſhould be found, that different orders were "ſent at the ſame time, will any man, he "aſks, ſay they could be both executed?" "To this ſuppoſition, I anſwer, that it is "next to impoſſible, for two *aides du camp* "to come at the ſame time, and each, in "one breath, to deliver different orders."

This author, who has, almoſt in every paragraph of his pamphlet, continued to draw arguments againſt our commander, from incredible premiſes, and hearſays, would, in this paragraph, inſinuate, that an authentic truth, which has not been contradicted, is next to impoſſible. Does not the authentic hiſtory of the battle, and all the letters which have ſet forth his conduct, acknowledge, that whilſt the firſt *aid de camp* was delivering him orders, to advance to ſupport the right wing, which was in great diſtreſs, the ſecond *aid de camp* came galloping, almoſt out of breath, with orders for him to advance with the *Britiſh* cavalry, for the ſupport of the left? were not theſe a contradiction, and delivered in the ſame minute? did not they want a further explanation? did not the prince explain them as he in the firſt place imagined, i. e. to leave ſome ſquadrons to the right, to prevent his being flanked, &c.? what would this ſhadow

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of an author, this pedlar in oratory, make us believe?

Yet he goes on, p. 41. to aſſert, " Your " apologiſt, who tells us, that his highneſs " on a former occaſion embarraſſed one of his " friends, with a like contrariety of orders, " does not venture to aſſure us, that ſuch an " embarraſſment rendered him totally inac- " tive. He does not ſay, that he ſtood qui- " etly and peaceably, with his hands before " him, waiting for an explanation. We are " to preſume, therefore, that he had the ſenſe " and ſpirit to put ſome conſtruction on his " orders." Were there ever ſuch bitter reflections caſt on an innocent perſon before? This is an author who has declared, that he was moved by no perſonal animoſity, heated by no party, inſtigated by no faction. Is it poſſible for any man in his ſenſes to believe him? does not he, in this very paragraph, aſſert the moſt flagrant untruths; and make the moſt bitter and partial reflections thereon? how can he aſſert, that the *Britiſh* general ſtood inactive, with his hands before him, waiting for an explanation? did not he immediately, on the receiving *Fitzroy*'s orders, gallop to the prince for an explanation, and, at the ſame time, order his *aid de camp* to bring forward the cavalry under his command? was this inactivity? how ſtrangely ſome men will alter the account of any tranſaction, by aſſerting their own thoughts as facts, and by putting a partial conſtruction on the whole! Is

not this the caſe of our author? does not partiality appear in almoſt every line, and the moſt ſevere and bitter reflections, in every paragraph, of his works? how, then, could the public be ſo pleaſed with his aſſertions? in p. 42. and 43. he would inſinuate, that he did not love to have a hand in weighing down thoſe who are ſinking, and yet, in the very next ſentence, he endeavours to let the public know, that our general's courage was problematical, from ſome whiſpered tales, which he would have them believe he had heard about St. *Cas*, but in his poſtſcript St. *Maloes*, thereby to increaſe their prejudice againſt an injured perſon. If he had any foundation for ſuch an aſſertion, or if any other perſon had heard theſe pretended tales, it might have been of ſome weight in this caſe; but to aſſert ſuch a groundleſs ſtory, knowing it to be ſuch, with an intent to injure a perſon, who has not been guilty of any crime, is cruel, and may be juſtly ſaid to proceed from malice. Thus, my lords and gentlemen, it clearly appears, that what this author has ſo craftily advanced as facts, are nothing more than his own vague notions, and the reports of a clamorous public; and the reflections which he has drawn therefrom, are the moſt ſevere and bitter that his heated imagination could invent: can I therefore imagine, that you, the repreſentatives of a free people, will regard ſuch a performance, calculated purely for the deſtruction of an innocent perſon? can I imagine, that the free

citizens

citizens of *Great-Britain*, will ſuffer their general to be thus tyrannically condemned, without giving him an impartial hearing? no ſurely. Are public reports, hearſays, and the reflections of every inſignificant author, ſufficient to condemn a nobleman of *Great-Britain*, or, in fact, one of the meaneſt ſubjects in the ſtate, without ſuffering him to make his defence? However, as this author has advanced ſo many ſuppoſes, hearſays, public reports, reports of his own inventing, tacit impeachments, and the moſt ſevere reflections, with an intent to inflame the public againſt, and condemn an innocent perſon, without any trial, or giving him any opportunity to defend himſelf; I hope your lordſhips, the honourable gentlemen of the commons, and the public in general, will indulge me to offer ſome authentic facts, with a view to clear the character, and reinſtate the honour of my country's injured general.

It is a well known fact, that, from the time the *Britiſh* forces paſſed over into *Germany*, till the battle at *Minden*, the commander in chief of the allied army, for reaſons beſt known to himſelf, grew jealous of the *Engliſh* general, treated him with haughtineſs and diſreſpect, refuſed him any ſhare in his councils, diſregarded any propoſals he made for the good of the army, and demanded a punctual obedience to any orders, which were brought to him by his *aides du camp*, or other officers. Is it not more probable, that this

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pique was the occaſion of his throwing this negative accuſation on him, than either of the means which this author has aſſerted? Again, is it not a fact, that the prince was ignorant of the march of the *French*, to attack the detatched corps of his army, commanded by lieutenant general *Wagenheim*, till they were fired upon from their batteries; and, that he had poſted the cavalry commanded by the *Britiſh* general, which ſhould have ſuſtained the right wing of his army, at ſuch a diſtance, that it was impoſſible they could have afforded any timely aſſiſtance to the infantry; but were in danger of being cut to pieces, if they had attempted to give ſuch aſſiſtance, according to the prince's firſt orders, as they had a wood, and ſeveral narrow paſſes to march through, where they were in danger of being flanked by the enemy's corps de reſerve? Therefore, it muſt clearly appear, that the prince was in an error, by poſting the cavalry, which ſhould have ſupported the right wing of his army, at too great a diſtance from the infantry; how, then, could the *Britiſh* general be anſwerable for any ill conſequences which might be occaſioned thereby? and why do we, in ſuch an unprecedented manner, condemn a perſon who was not guilty of any crime? but further. Notwithſtanding, the ſituation of the cavalry, which ſhould have ſupported the infantry of the right wing, did not the general in chief order them to advance, without taking any precaution to prevent the enemy from coming upon

upon their right, and flanking them? was not this another error? did not the *Britiſh* general perceive it, and repreſent it to the commander in chief? why, then, is he accuſed for this? again, were not colonel *Fitzroy*'s orders directly contrary thereto, and delivered almoſt inſtantaneouſly after the firſt? But, yet, this author would aſſert, that they did not want any explanation, and has condemned him for not carrying them immediately into execution. Was not the commander in chief, likewiſe, in an error, when he ordered the cavalry, which ſhould have ſupported the right wing, to advance towards the left? was he not convinced of his error, when he ordered the *Britiſh* cavalry again, to advance towards the right? is it not, therefore, paſt all doubt, that he has thrown this negative accuſation on their general, to ſcreen himſelf of thoſe errors; eſpecially, as by the unexampled bravery of his troops, he has won the battle? but, farther, is it not a fact, beyond all diſpute, that the *Britiſh* horſe had never proper orders to attack, or purſue, the enemy? were they not ſuffered to retire unmoleſted in their retreat? were not the *Britiſh* horſe drawn out in readineſs for a purſuit, when the duke of *Richmond*, and colonel *Webb*, brought orders to diſmount the men? was not this another error in the prince? why, then, ſhould the *Britiſh* general be ſtigmatized, and accuſed for crimes whereof he was not guilty?

If the commander in chief was one of the greateſt emperors in the world, and had all the military merit of the monarch of *Pruſſia*, yet I cannot conceive why we ſhould eſteem him for loading an innocent man with infamy. His errors in judgment we ſhould readily forgive, as all mankind are ſubject to the like; and his good qualities we ſhould eſteem; but I muſt leave your lordſhips and the public to judge, in what light we ought to regard him as a man, who would endeavour to injure his fellow-creature, in ſuch a manner as he has endeavoured to do the *Britiſh* general? as it is obvious, from the authentic hiſtory of the battle, from facts undiſputed, and from evidence beyond contradiction, that our commander has been unjuſtly accuſed of the crimes laid to his charge, will not your lordſhips, the honourable gentlemen of the commons, and the impartial part of the public, redreſs his wrongs, and reinſtate his honour? I am perſuaded you will; for it is inconſiſtent with reaſon to imagine, that the repreſentatives of a free people ſhould ſuffer a member of their honourable body to be tyrannically cruſhed.

Has not the meaneſt ſubject in the ſtate, according to our impartial laws, a right to juſtice, and an equitable trial; why, then, ſhould our noble general be debarred therefrom, when he has ſo often ſolicited for it? Shall the clamour of the public, who have been inflamed by the falſe and malicious reports that have been propagated againſt him, and by the

the many ſevere and invidious reflections which have been drawn therefrom by ſome contemptible writers, abate the force of juſtice? will they not hear what their fellow-citizen has to ſay in his own vindication? will they ſhut their ears to truth, tho' it charms them ever ſo wiſely? ſurely they will not; I am perſuaded, that they will withdraw their cenſure, when they perceive that he is innocent, and that he has been unjuſtly treated; I am perſuaded, that they will abide by truth, when they ſee it developed from falſehood; I am perſuaded, that they will puniſh the accuſed perſon, when they prove that his accuſations are juſt; and I am perſuaded, that they will reinſtate his honour, when it is proved that he was innocent of the crimes laid to his charge, and when his ſuppoſed delinquency appears to be without foundation; which, that they may, my Lords and Gentlemen, is the ardent wiſh of

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